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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The State appeals from the district court’s order granting Mr. Pool’s motion to suppress
the evidence of his blood draw. Mr. Pool acknowledges that he did not provide evidence that he
withdrew his implied consent. He therefore requests that this Court reconsider its prior decisions
that have held that statutorily implied consent remains valid until affirmatively withdrawn.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts are taken from the district court’s order granting Mr. Pool’s motion
to suppress. On January 12, 2016, Officer Casey Hancuff from the Boise Police Department
came upon a crash scene involving Mr. Pool and another driver. (R., p.138.) Mr. Pool was
driving a 1997 Mazda pickup truck. (R., p.138.) Mr. Pool was initially render unconscious but
regained consciousness on the scene, although he was still dazed and confused. (R., p.138.)
Mr. Pool’s son was in the passenger seat and informed Officer Hancuff that his father was taking
medications, but had not been drinking. (R., pp.138-39.) Some medications were found at the
scene. (R., p.139.) Prior to the accident, Officer Hancuff had been looking for a pickup which
had been driving erratically, but this truck did not match Mr. Pool’s vehicle. (R., p.139.)
Mr. Pool was taken to the hospital, where Officer Hancuff questioned him. (R. p.139.)
While Mr. Pool was generally coherent, his responses were slow and seemed confused at times.
(R., p.139.) Mr. Pool seemed confused about the day of the week and he said he had recently
been released from “rehab” and was taking medications. (R., p.139.) He said that he might have
had a beer, but it was not clear when, and Mr. Pool was confused about when he had been
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released from his treatment program. (R., p.139.) It was clear that Mr. Pool was taking various
medications. (R., p.139.)
The normal procedure for taking a blood draw, according to Officer Hancuff, involves
reading the advisory form and asking the driver for verbal consent for the blood draw.
(R., p.139.) That procedure was not followed in this case. (R., p.139.) Rather, because a
phlebotomist was taking a blood sample for the hospital treatment purposes, Officer Hancuff
gave him his evidence blood draw kid and asked if he would get a sample too, as a matter of
convenience. (R., p.139.) Officer Hancuff never asked for consent. (R., pp.139-40.) Further,
he made no effort to secure a warrant. (R., p.140.) Finally, the court noted that Officer Hancuff
had not detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath and also testified that it would
have been impractical to do the field sobriety tests when the defendant was in the hospital.
(R., p.140.) The officer had not observed Mr. Pool’s driving pattern prior to the accident.
(R., p.140.) Medications do not dissipate in the blood stream in the same manner as alcohol
does. (R., p.140). There was time to get a warrant. (R., p.140.)
Mr. Pool was charged with felony injury to a child, felony driving under the influence of
alcohol, drugs, or an intoxicating substance, and driving without privileges. (R., p.62.) He filed
a motion to suppress, asserting that the blood draw was unconstitutional because he did not
provide consent, and any consent that he could provide would not have been voluntary due to his
mental state following the accident. (R., pp.105-06.)
The district court granted Mr. Pool’s motion to suppress. (R., p.138.) The court noted
that “more directly than any reported case in Idaho, this case places at issues whether Idaho’s
implied consent statute overrides the United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protections
when there is no exigency at all and when a warrant could have readily been obtained for a blood
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draw.” (R., p.141.) The district court addressed and distinguished this Court’s recent decision in
State v. Charlson:
In State v. Charlson, l60 Idaho 610, 377 P.3d 1073 (2016), the Idaho Supreme
Court upheld the warrantless blood draw of a DUI suspect who had crashed his
motorcycle, had empty beer cans in his motorcycle saddlebags, admitted to
drinking and smelled of alcohol when a sheriff’s deputy came upon the scene. The
deputy asked a Life-Flight crew to get a blood sample when they transported the
injured suspect to the hospital in Boise. The accident occurred in a remote area
and the parties stipulated that in rural Boise County, at that time, there was no
procedure in place for telephone warrants, there was no cellphone reception where
the crash happened and the deputy had to stay on the scene to deal with the
aftermath of the accident. The Court held that the Idaho implied consent statute
permitted the blood draw because the suspect had not withdrawn his consent and
had driven voluntarily. In its conclusion, the Court said that it was considering
“the totality of the circumstances,” not that it was creating a per se rule. Id at 618.
The Court had no occasion to address the fact that the statute itself separately
refers “evidentiary testing” and then, specifically, to the power of an officer to
order a blood sample for evidentiary testing when the law enforcement officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed certain enumerated
offenses: Aggravated Driving Under the Influence, Vehicular Manslaughter,
aggravated boating offenses or criminal homicide per I.C. § 18- 8002(6)(b). The
statute also separately refers to the power of an officer to request a second
evidentiary test of blood or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of
drugs or intoxicating substances or both. I.C. § 18-8002(10). The difference in
wording between the types of testing was not of significance in Charlson because
of the other exigencies so it would not have been addressed. The Court did not
deal with the issue of whether the statute created an impermissible per se waiver,
in a situation where a warrant could easily, quickly and readily be obtained, thus
allowing an officer to dispense with a warrant because it was inconvenient. In
fact, in State v. Wulff, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that it read McNeely as
“prohibiting all per se exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 423. It
observed that the recent remand of a Texas case, Aviles, supported the analysis
that the correct test is the totality of the circumstances and that implied consent
statutes could not create per se exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Idaho
Supreme Court has addressed issues of revocation of consent but it has not
addressed the situation in this case where a warrant could have been readily
obtained from an on call magistrate and no exigent circumstances exist.
The facts in this case are significantly different. The Charlson court indicated in
its conclusion that it was basing its decision upon the “totality of the
circumstances.” Based upon the totality of the circumstances in this case, when a
warrant can be readily obtained and there is no exigency, a warrant must be
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obtained. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires a
warrant under the facts of this case.
(R., pp.143-44.) The State appealed. (R., p.154.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court correctly grant Mr. Pool’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Pool’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Pool asserts that the district court’s ultimate conclusion, that absent exigent

circumstances or actual consent, the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant, is correct. To the
extent that this Court’s precedent holds otherwise, Mr. Pool respectfully requests that the Court
reconsider its prior decisions.

B.

Standard Of Review
“In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, this Court will

defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous. However, free review is
exercised over a trial court’s determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been
satisfied in light of the facts found.” State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 470 (2001).

C.

The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Pool’s Motion To Suppress
The State submits that there was no evidence that Mr. Pool withdrew his implied consent

and therefore it remained valid through the blood draw. (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) The State
therefore asserts that the district court erred by focusing on whether there was an exigency and
concluding that “when a warrant can be readily obtained and there is no exigency, a warrant
must be obtained.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) Mr. Pool acknowledges that, in State v. Charlson,
this Court held that “statutorily provided implied consent is valid and remains in place until
affirmatively withdrawn.” Charlson, 160 Idaho at 618. Mr. Pool also acknowledges that he
provided no evidence that he withdrew his implied consent. Thus, the State’s assertion that the
district court erred by requiring evidence of an exigency is well taken. However, based on

6

decisions from the United States Supreme Court, the district court’s ultimate conclusion – that
the State must demonstrate either an exigency or actual consent – is correct, and to the extent this
Court’s precedent holds otherwise, Mr. Pool respectfully requests that this Court reconsider and
overrule is prior decisions.
The Fourth Amendment provides that, “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. It is well-established that a governmental intrusion into the human body
which is attendant to a compelled blood draw is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Halen v. State, 136
Idaho 829, 833 (2002). “Such an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual’s ‘most
personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148
(2013) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)).
By its plain language, the Fourth Amendment evinces a preference that governmental
searches and seizures be conducted pursuant to warrants. See United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102, 105-06 (1965). This preference has come to inform the question of what is an
“unreasonable” search or seizure, such that “searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.”
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Accord State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728, 730 (2002). “The exceptions are
jealously and carefully drawn, and there must be a showing by those who seek exemption . . .
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that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. [T]he burden is on those
seeking the exemption to show the need for it.” Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455 (internal quotation
marks and footnotes omitted; alterations in Coolidge). Thus, the State bears “a heavy burden” to
justify a warrantless search or seizure. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984);
State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225 (1993).
This case involves the consent exception to the warrant requirement. In State v. Diaz,
this Court cited the relevant portion of Idaho’s implied consent statute, I.C. § 18-8002(1), and
held that, based on the statute, when one drives on Idaho’s roads, one gives irrevocable consent
to blood draws. 144 Idaho 300, 302-03 (2007). However, in Missouri v. McNeely, the United
States Supreme Court held that, “while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may
support a finding of exigency in a specific case, . . . it does not do so categorically. Whether a
warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case
on the totality of the circumstances.” McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013). Following McNeely,
Diaz was overruled. In State v. Wulff, the Idaho Supreme Court extrapolated from McNeely,
reasoning that if there can be no per se exigency rule, nor can there be a per se consent rule; it
then held that any consent implied by I.C. § 18-8002(1) can be withdrawn or revoked. 157 Idaho
416, 420-23 (2014). See also State v. Arotta, 157 Idaho 773, 774 (2014) (re-affirming the
holding of Wulff); State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 645-46 (2014). In so holding, the Court
pointed out that such an interpretation of McNeely is consistent with prior Supreme Court
precedent holding that consent must be voluntary, and the voluntariness of consent is a factual
question (to be proved by the government), which must be analyzed under the totality of the
circumstances. See Wulff, 157 Idaho at 422 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973)).
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While Wulff, Halseth, and Arotta held that consent, once implied as a matter of law,
could be withdrawn, they did not specifically address the question of whether consent could be
implied as a matter of law in the first instance. On the one hand, Wulff made it clear that
“implied consent is no longer acceptable when it operates as a per se exception to the warrant
requirement because the [Supreme] Court repeatedly expressed disapproval for categorical
rules,” Wulff, 157 Idaho at 421, but on the other hand, it also went on to state:
Idaho’s implied consent statute must jump two hurdles to qualify as voluntary:
(1) drivers give their initial consent voluntarily and (2) drivers must continue to
give voluntary consent. Drivers in Idaho give their initial consent to evidentiary
testing by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303,
160 P.3d 739, 742 (2007).
Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423. In three subsequent cases, two different panels of the Idaho Court of
Appeals held that, although now revocable, consent may still be implied as a matter of law
pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002(1). See Bobeck v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 159 Idaho 539, 543-45
(Ct. App. 2015), rev. denied (2015); Sims v. State, 159 Idaho 249, 255-57 (Ct. App. 2015), rev.
denied (2015); State v. Smith, 159 Idaho 15, 25-26 (Ct. App. 2015), rev. denied (2015).
However, two judges—Judges Lansing and Gutierrez—disagreed with the notion that consent
can be implied as a matter of law. See Bobeck, 159 Idaho at 545-46 (Gutierrez, S., dissenting)
(arguing that “statutorily implied consent is insufficient to satisfy the consent exception to the
warrant requirement” because the Fourth Amendment requires actual consent); Smith, 159 Idaho
at 28-30 (Lansing, K., concurring) (arguing that under the consent exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement, there must be a finding of actual consent; a legal fiction
created by statute will not suffice). More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court has weighed in in
on whether implied consent is valid consent within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
Supreme Court has said that it is.
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First, in State v. Eversole, the Court rejected the notion that consent cannot be implied as
a matter of law. 160 Idaho 239, 242-43 (2016). It reasoned that because the McNeely case did
not clearly invalidate “implied consent” statutes, those statutes must be valid for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Id. Specifically, the Eversole Court reasoned that consent implied by law
is valid consent under the Fourth Amendment because: (1) nothing in McNeely “specifically
addressed[ed] the validity of implied consent statutes much less h[e]ld that implied consent
statutes cannot serve as an exception to the warrant requirement”; (2) McNeely’s emphasis on a
“totality of the circumstances test was in regards to the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement, not to implied consent statutes,” (3) “Nowhere does McNeely suggest that
implied consent statutes do not constitute constitutional consent or that a totality of the
circumstances test is the exclusive means for establishing consent”; and (4) McNeely recognized
that implied consent statutes, which provide for administrative penalties if drivers refuses to
submit to evidentiary testing, are among “a broad range of legal tools to enforce [ ] drunk-driving
laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws.”
Eversole, 160 Idaho at 243.
In State v. Rios, the defendant again apparently argued that consent implied as a matter of
law was not sufficient to establish consent for Fourth Amendment purposes. See 160 Idaho 262,
266 (2016). This Court relied upon Eversole in rejecting the defendant’s argument: “As we
concluded in Eversole, under McNeely, implied consent may satisfy the consent exception to the
warrant requirement. Therefore, actual consent is not required.” Id.
Most recently, in State v. Charlson, this Court assumed that “implied consent” was valid
consent for Fourth Amendment purposes, and held that because the defendant had not withdrawn
the consent that was deemed to exist as a matter of law, the blood draw at issue in that case was
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consensual for Fourth Amendment purposes. 160 Idaho 610, 617-18 (2016). The Court quoted
Rios for the proposition that “[u]nder Idaho law, a driver’s implied consent continues if it is not
revoked before the time of evidentiary testing.” Id. at 618. The Court of Appeals has affirmed
these holdings in State v. Ortega-Vastida, 161 Idaho 894 (Ct. App. 2017).
Mr. Pool acknowledges that he did not present evidence that he revoked his implied
consent. Therefore, he acknowledges that if this Court applies the rule from the above-cited
authorities, he did not revoke his implied consent. However, he respectfully requests that this
Court reconsider its prior decisions and now hold that the State must demonstrate actual consent.
Implied consent, by itself, does not satisfy the consent exception to the warrant requirement.
While the Idaho Supreme Court will follow precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis,
it need not do so where: (1) that precedent “is manifestly wrong,” (2) that precedent “it has
proven over time to be unjust or unwise,” or (3) overruling that precedent “is necessary to
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v. Humphreys,
134 Idaho 657, 660 (2000) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77
(1990)). In this case, Mr. Pool submits that the relevant portions of Eversole, Rios, and Charlson
are manifestly wrong, in that they are contrary to controlling United States Supreme Court
precedent on the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment, and that because of this conflict,
overruling the relevant portions of Eversole, Rios, and Charlson is necessary to vindicate plain,
obvious Fourth Amendment principles and prevent the deprivation of Idahoans’ Fourth
Amendment rights.
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the government has the burden of
proving consent for a given search was freely and voluntarily given, and it has held that the
question of whether consent was so given is a factual question, the resolution of which calls for
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an examination of the totality of the circumstances. In Bumper v. North Carolina, the Court
held, “When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has
the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.” 391 U.S. 543,
548 (1968) (quoted with approval in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222, 227 (1973));
accord Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). Later, in Schneckloth, the Court engaged in
a fairly lengthy analysis of what “voluntary consent” means, and it concluded that “the question
whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion,
express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. In other words, for purposes of the consent
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, the government is required to prove
that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant actually consented to the search in
question.
In view of the foregoing Supreme Court precedent, it is apparent that Idaho’s “implied
consent” statute cannot, on its own, establish consent for Fourth Amendment purposes. 1 First,
contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court’s analysis in Eversole, it is precisely the type of
impermissible per se standard that was rejected in McNeely and Wulff. Further, it is plainly
inconsistent with the “consent” standards set forth in Bumper, Schneckloth, and their progeny
1

Mr. Pool is not asserting that “implied consent” statutes are unconstitutional in all respects. To
the extent they permit a State to impose administrative penalties (such as driver’s license
suspensions) on licensed drivers who refuse evidentiary testing, Mr. Pool concedes they are still
valid. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 443, 554 (1983); see also McNeely, 569 U.S. at
160-61 (“States have a broad range of legal tools to enforce their drunk-driving laws and to
secure BAC evidence without undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws. For example,
all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of
operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or
otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense. Such laws impose significant
consequences when a motorist withdraws consent; typically the motorist’s driver’s license is
immediately suspended or revoked, and most States allow the motorist’s refusal to take a BAC
test to be used as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.”) (citation omitted).
12

since: it transforms the relevant inquiry from a factual determination to a legal determination; it
fails to take into account the totality of the circumstances; and rather than requiring the State to
prove voluntary consent, it creates a presumption of consent which the defendant has to
overcome by affirmatively demonstrating revocation.
Finally, to uphold Idaho’s implied consent statute for purposes of determining consent in
the Fourth Amendment context would be to permit the Idaho Legislature to determine Fourth
Amendment standards, which it clearly cannot do. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11
(1979) (state statute which purports to authorize police in some circumstances to make searches
and seizures without probable cause and without search warrants falls within the category of
statutes “purporting to authorize searches without probable cause, which the Court has not
hesitated to hold invalid as authority for unconstitutional searches.”) The United States Supreme
Court’s Opinion in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008), is particularly instructive on
this issue. In Moore, the United States Supreme Court held that Virginia police officers did not
violate the Fourth Amendment when they arrested a motorist whom they had probable cause to
believe had violated a Virginia state statute by driving with a suspended license, even though the
state statute did not authorize the officers to arrest the motorist. Moore, 553 U.S. at 166-67, 178.
The Moore Court concluded that state laws do not alter the reasonableness of an arrest for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 173-76. Because the officers had probable cause, the
Court held that the arrest of the motorist was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment despite
the violation of state law. Id. at 178.
The same is true here; Idaho’s implied consent law does not alter the reasonableness of a
search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. And the United States Supreme Court’s
decisions on consent are clear, as was set forth above: the government is required to prove that,
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under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant actually consented to the search in
question.
Further, other states have held that implied consent cannot justify a search pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment’s consent exception. In State v. Havatone, 389 P.3d 1251 (Ariz. 2017), the
Arizona Supreme Court noted that Arizona’s implied consent law deemed an unconscious driver
to have consented. Id. at 1255. The court concluded that, “following McNeely [ . . .] Arizona’s
implied consent statute [. . .] does not relieve the state of establishing voluntary consent or
another exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. The court concluded that “the unconscious
clause can be constitutionally applied only when case-specific exigent circumstances prevent law
enforcement officers from obtaining a warrant.” Id. Further, the Supreme Court of Georgia
noted that “sister states have considered statutory implied consent as an exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement in the wake of McNeely” and “what the cases seem to
indicate is that mere compliance with statutory implied consent does not, per se, equate to actual,
and therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to be an exception to the
constitutional mandate of a warrant.” Williams v. State, 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 (Ga. 2015) (citing
People v. Harris, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 (2015); Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.
2014); State v. Padley, 849 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. App. 2014); State v. Moore, 318 P.3d 1133 (Ore.
2013); State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013)).
In view of the foregoing precedent, Judges Lansing and Guiterrez were correct when they
penned separate opinions in Smith and Bobeck, respectively. In Smith, Judge Lansing concurred
with the result, but wrote that she would hold that “implied consent” does not constitute
constitutional consent. Smith, 159 Idaho at 657. This is because “implied consent,” “involves no
actual consent at all; the co-called consent is entirely fictitious.”
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Id.

As Judge Lansing

explained, “implied consent is a legal fiction created by statute which . . . cannot trump
constitutional guarantees against warrantless intrusions on one’s person or liberty. A legislative
body may not simply legislate away constitutional rights.” Id. at 657-58. Likewise, in Bobeck,
Judge Gutierrez dissented on the basis that the Fourth Amendment requires actual consent, not
merely consent implied as a matter of law. Bobeck, 159 Idaho at 545. He concluded that, “The
totality of the circumstances analysis for determining whether consent is voluntary confirms that
the one circumstance—driving on Idaho roads is insufficient to constitute actual, voluntary
consent.” Id. at 546.
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Pool asserts that Eversole, Rios, and Charlson were
manifestly wrong when they were decided, and they should now be overruled in order to
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law, and to avoid the injustice attendant to depriving
defendants like Mr. Pool of their Fourth Amendment rights. Mr. Pool urges this Court to apply
the United States Supreme Court’s standard to the question of whether he consented to the blood
draw at issue in this case, not the lesser standard identified by the Idaho Legislature. The
Supreme Court standard, identified in Bumper, Schneckloth, and their progeny, and reflected in
the separate opinions of Judge Lansing and Judge Gutierrez from Smith and Bobeck,
respectively, required the State to prove that Mr. Pool actually consented to the blood draw.
The district court in this case correctly determined that Mr. Pool did not affirmatively
consent to the blood draw and that there were no exigent circumstances. Because the State did
not demonstrate that Mr. Pool actually consented to the blood draw, the district court correctly
granted Mr. Pool’s motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Pool respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the district court.
DATED this 16th day of August, 2018.

/s/ Justin M. Curtis
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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